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ABSTRACT 
This thesis assesses the normative basis of the law of the European Union according to 
selected theories of legal and ethical philosophy. Firstly it employs the methodology of 
legal theorist Hans Kelsen, who envisioned a legal order as a hierarchy of norms with a 
central norm or Grundnorm at the peak of this hierarchy. Ten such norms are identified 
within the EU Treaties and related documents, and encompass values such as the 
„promotion of peace‟, the „rule of law‟ and „democracy‟. However, an examination of 
the jurisprudential approach of the Court of Justice, which occupies a prominent place 
in the constitutional law of the EU legal order alongside the Treaties, suggests that the 
Grundnorm of the EU law is of a functional nature, and is chiefly concerned with the 
establishment and maintenance of the European Common Market. An assessment of this 
Grundnorm using the contrasting ethical theories of Kantianism and utilitarianism 
suggests that the legal philosophy of the European Union is thus consequentially ethical, 
as the European Common Market brings many benefits, but it is not primarily governed 
by the protection of deontological values, with these values consistently subordinated to 
the Common Market Grundnorm. It is then suggested that the functional basis of this 
Grundnorm will create problems for the ethical legitimacy of the EU legal order in the 
longer term; it has been constructed in this way by the Court of Justice due to the 
identity crisis of the Community as caused by the on-going democratic deficit. Thus an 
ideal Grundnorm for the EU legal system should have a core basis in ethical values, 
especially those relating to democracy, human rights and the rule of law.   
Language and size of the thesis: English (91 pp.) 
Keywords: European Union, European Union Law, Legal Philosophy, Ethical 
Philosophy, Normative, Common Market, Utilitarianism, Categorical Imperative, 
Kelsen, Mill, Kant  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Purpose and structure of thesis 
The European Union has a population of over 500 million citizens, with the legal 
system having a sizeable impact on virtually every aspect of their lives. Furthermore, 
the long-standing principle of supremacy
1
, as established by Costa v ENEL
2
, means that 
where there is a conflict between European Union law and the national law of a 
Member State, EU law must take primacy.
3
 In addition to this highly pervasive 
influence of EU law internally, the European Union has increasingly played the role of a 
normative power on the international stage.
4
 Thus understanding the EU legal system 
has a truly ethical core is an extremely important area of inquiry. 
This thesis will identify and evaluate the normative basis of the legal system of the 
European Union using the tools of legal and ethical philosophy, as well as make 
tentative suggestions as to how this basis might develop in the future. Initially, it will do 
this by analysing the constitutional sources of EU law, chiefly the EU Treaties and 
related documents, as well as the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU)
 5
. This analysis will be performed using the theories of legal philosopher 
Hans Kelsen, who viewed the basis of a legal order as a normative hierarchy with a 
central norm or Grundnorm at its peak. Ten underlying normative values are identified 
in the Treaties and related documents, including norms such as the promotion of peace, 
supranationality, the rule of law, the Common Market, associative human rights and 
democracy. It will be noted that identifying the Grundnorm from amongst these core 
principles requires an examination of the jurisprudence of the CJEU, due to the 
centrality of this court within the EU legal order. Using the Court‟s jurisprudence, the 
                                                 
1
 See Roman Kwiecień, „The Primacy of European Union Law over National Law Under the 
Constitutional Treaty‟, German Law Journal, 6.11 (2005), 1479-1496.  
2
 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 (6/64) 
3
 Alan Dashwood, Michael Dougan, Barry Rodger, Eleanor Spaventa and Derrick Wyatt, Derrick, Wyatt 
and Dashwood's European Union Law, 6
th
 edn., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011),  pp. 270-278 
4
 Helene Sjursen „The EU as a normative power: how can this be?‟ Journal of European Public Policy, 
13.2 (2006), (p.235). 
5
 The European Court of Justice or the ECJ, officially the Court of Justice, is a component part of the 
three courts of the CJEU. 
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Grundnorm of the EU legal order will be defined; it will be shown that this Grundnorm 
has a functional rather than a values-based orientation, and is related chiefly to the 
establishment and operation of the Common Market. 
The identified Grundnorm will then be assessed according to two leading theories of 
ethical philosophy – the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant and the utilitarianism 
of John Stuart Mill. This assessment will suggest that the Grundnorm of EU law is more 
congenial to consequentialist utilitarians than it is to deontological Kantians. The 
shortcomings of the consequentialist philosophy will then be discussed, with the 
suggestion that the Grundnorm of the European Union be developed towards a more 
Kantian emphasis, specifically via addressing the long-standing and still-existent 
democratic deficit of the Community. A new Grundnorm of the European Union law 
will then be proposed; a Grundnorm with a deontological emphasis on democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law.    
1.2 Background: The European Union as a normative power 
Professor Ian Manners of the University of Copenhagen has stated: 
 „The EU has been, is and always will be a normative power ...‟6 
Similarly Knud Jorgensen and Katie Laatikainen observe; 
„…the EU‟s self-image is characterised by a curious blindness to own interests. Instead, 
the Union tends to present itself as a force for goodness in international society.‟7 
This viewpoint regards the aims of the European Union as an international actor as the 
promotion of „normative principles that are … universally applicable.‟8 The European 
Union has been described as „Kantian‟ power, especially when contrasted with the 
                                                 
6
 Ian Manners, ‘The normative ethics of the European Union’, International Affairs, 84.1 (2008), 65-
80(p.65) 
7
 Jørgensen, Knud and Laatikainen, Katie „The EU and the UN: multilateralism in a new key?‟, Second 
Pan-European Conference on EU Politics: ‘Implications of a Wider Europe: Politics, Institutions and 
Diversity (Bologna: University of Bologna, 2004), p. 15 
8
 Manners, „‘The normative ethics of the European Union’, p. 66 
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„Hobbesian‟ / „might makes right‟ United States of America9 or the Realpolitik oriented 
Russian Federation.
10
  
There are a number of arguments supporting this opinion. Firstly, unlike most nation 
states or military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 
EU has historically lacked military instruments (although this is no longer the case), and 
thus tends to take a „civilising‟ rather than coercive role.11 In other words, even though 
it now has military capabilities, the EU still prefers „soft‟/ „civilian‟ instruments of 
negotiation and persuasion, rather than the use or threat of force.
12
 Yet it must be noted 
that the EU has no qualms about employing „soft‟ coercive instruments such as 
economic sanctions both internally
13
 and externally
14
. 
Furthermore, the preference for civilian over military instruments does not in of itself 
establish as an „ethical‟ institution. Proponents of the „just war‟ theory argues that acts 
of collective violence can be „moral‟15, while the existing framework of international 
law permits acts of force under certain circumstances.
16
 For example Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter recognises the „inherent right‟ of „individual or collective self-
defence‟ if a Member country of the UN is experiences an „armed attack.‟ Articles 39 to 
42 of the Charter permit the UN Security Council to authorise the use of force where 
there is a „threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.‟ Helene Sjursen 
comments: 
                                                 
9
 Sjursen, p.238 
10
 See James Headley, „Is Russia out of step with European norms? Assessing Russia‟s Relationship to 
European Identity, Values and Norms through the Issue of Self-Determination‟, Europe-Asia Studies, 
64.3 (2012), 427-447. 
11
 Richard Sakwa, „Looking for a greater Europe: From mutual dependence to an international regime‟, 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 45 (2012), 315-325 
12
 Ibid., pp.238-240 
13
 Jonas Tallberg, „Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union‟. 
International Organization, 56.3 (2002), 609–643 (p.9) 
14
 „European Council focuses on Ukraine crisis and further sanctions‟, European Council, 
<http://www.european-council.europa.eu/home-page/highlights/european-council-focuses-on-ukraine-
and-further-sanctions?lang=en> [accessed 26 September 2014] 
15
 See Grotius, Vattel, Vitoria and Suarez in The Classics of International Law. ed. by James Brown Scott 
(Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1912) 
16
 Nicholas Tsagourias, „Necessity and the Use of Force: A Special Regime‟, Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, 41.2 (2010) 
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„What if important norms are clearly and systematically broken? Would this not 
provoke a responsibility to react rather than to look the other way?‟17 
This viewpoint is perhaps particularly relevant when we consider the current (2014) 
crisis in the Ukraine, where the EU response has been described as „toothless‟ and 
„feeble‟.18 In other words, many believe a more strongly coercive response to Russian 
aggression to be more normatively valid than the current „realist‟ policy.19 
A second argument in favour of a „normative‟ EU is located in an evaluation of the EU 
external policy. Some observe that EU enlargement policies, particularly with regard to 
former Soviet bloc countries, are primarily motivated by what „ought‟ to be done, rather 
than pragmatism or self-interest.
20
 Yet sceptics note that, for example, the EU‟s 
promulgation of human rights in third countries also tend to align with their strategic 
interests.
21
 This potential criticism of „hypocrisy‟, whether justified or not, does 
diminish the strength of this argument as a primary indicator of the ethical basis of the 
European integration project.
 22
 
Instead, this thesis suggests that the ethical legitimacy of the European Union be 
evaluated via a study of the core principles of its legal system. Helene Sjursen notes: 
„There is always a risk that actors will follow their own interests even if they know this 
may harm others, or suspect that others do so, even if they say the opposite. In order to 
avoid such risks, common rules are necessary. The law functions as a system of action 
that makes it possible to implement moral duties or commitments … To „act in a 
normative way‟ would be to act in accordance with legal principles … The pursuit 
                                                 
17
 Sjursen, p. 239 
18
 Ewen MacAskill, Shaun Walker and Dan Roberts, „US rejects criticism of 'toothless' sanctions 
following Crimea referendum‟, The Guardian, 18 March 2014, 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/us-eu-sanctions-russia-ukraine-crimea-referendum> 
[accessed 26 September 2014] 
19
 Ian Klinke, „Postmodern Geopolitics? The European Union eyes Russia‟, Europe-Asia Studies, 64.5 
(2012), 929-947 
20
 Sjursen, p. 239 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 See Licínia Simão, „Discursive differences and policy outcomes: EU-Russia relations and security in 
Europe‟, Eastern Journal of European Studies, 2.1 (2011), 81-95for a discussion of the Russian critique 
of the „normative‟ nature of EU enlargement policy. 
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of norms would be legitimate in the sense that it would be consistent with agreed legal 
norms.‟ 
The conceptualisation of the supranational European law as a normative force can be 
traced to the very early days of European integration. Walter Hallstein, the first 
President of the European Commission, commented: 
„The European Economic Community is a remarkable legal phenomenon. It is a 
creation of the law; it is a source of law; and it is a legal system.‟23 
Additionally, he upheld the uniqueness of the EU legislative project: 
„We have tried to rise above the legal forms and traditions of the past. Many would no 
doubt call our attempt “revolutionary”, and it may well be that future generations will 
come to regard the philosophical and legal concept underlying Europe‟s constitution as 
the most creative achievement in the evolution of jurisprudence in our age, and perhaps 
even the most original feature in our effort to integrate Europe.‟24 
Hallstein thus interpreted Community law as both a driver and a result of European 
integration. The EU legal order is completely central to the identity of the European 
supranational community. Thus in our evaluation of ethical basis of the legal philosophy 
of the European Union we are, at least to some extent, evaluating whether the European 
Union itself is a truly ethical and normatively-based undertaking.  
  
                                                 
23
 Henriette Müller, „The Point of No Return: Walter Hallstein and the EEC Commission between 
Institutional Ambitions and Political Constraints‟, Les Cahiers européens de Sciences (2012) Paper No. 
03/2012  (p. 10) 
24
 Ibid., p. 9 
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2. Theoretical approach 
2.1 Selected theories 
This section describes the main legal and ethical philosophical theories that will be 
employed by this thesis. They are: 
 Positivism 
 Hans Kelsen‟s „Pure Theory of Law‟ 
 The ethical theories of the „categorical imperative‟ and „utilitarianism‟ 
2.2 Positivism versus Natural law 
In legal scholarship there are two major approaches to understanding what, in 
philosophical terms, law actually is. These are the natural law theory and positivism. 
The natural law theory has ancient origins, originating in the Summa Theologica of the 
medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas. Under the natural law theory, law is the rational 
standard for conduct. It provides a set of standards for rational agents to guide their 
choices. Anything at odds with these standards is not law but simply invalid – no law at 
all.
25
 By contrast positivism believes in „the separation, or at least the separability, of 
law and morals‟26, or in other words, the existence and content of law is dependent on 
social facts, rather than its moral merit.   
With regard to human rights within the natural law system, natural law theorist John 
Finnis argues that natural law starting with Aquinas upholds that „there are rights which 
every member of our species is entitled to: human rights.‟27 For natural law theorists 
intrinsic rights arise from nature and are universal.  
                                                 
25
 Mark Murphy, „Natural Law Jurisprudence‟, Legal Theory, 9 (2003), 241-267, p. 244 
26
 Murphy, p. 244 
27
 As summarized in Brian Tierney, „Natural Law and Natural Right: Old Problems and Recent 
Approaches‟, The Review of Politics, 64.3 (2002), 389-406, p. 391. 
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This differs from the positivist approach, where rights are defined as freedoms we give 
up so as to be bound by the law, in accordance with the benefits we receive as part of 
the social contract. As the early positivist Thomas Hobbes wrote:  
„RIGHT consists in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas LAW determines and binds … 
so that Law and Right differ as much as obligation and liberty …‟28 
This thesis will follow a positivist understanding of what law really is. In other words, 
this thesis accepts that the posited law of the European Union in the Treaties, related 
documents and Court of Justice jurisprudence can be described as law however this 
posited law may or may not be moral or ethical. This is not so much a rejection of the 
natural law theory but essentially a choice of convenience – positivism allows us both to 
identify the underlying normative structure of the EU legal order and thus assess it 
independently according to ethical theories. Thus a positivist approach has been selected 
over natural law primarily due to simpler semantics.
29
  
It should also be noted however that the natural law concept that morality and ethics 
ultimately arise from „nature‟ – that they have a metaphysical basis and are not merely 
social constructs – is broadly accepted by this thesis. This means, for example, that 
certain rights are indeed „natural‟ and „fundamental‟ and cannot be denied to individuals 
in any ethical legal system. This approach contrasts with the purely „scientific‟ / 
materialist approach to defining law as advanced by the Nordic school legal 
philosophers such as Axel Hägerström.
30
 
2.3 Hans Kelsen‟s „Pure Theory of Law‟: Norms and the Grundnorm 
There are a number of theoretical frameworks that can be applied to identifying the core 
principles of a legal system. These encompass theories as diverse as the linguistic 
                                                 
28
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. (Hamilton: McMaster University Archive Edition, 1651), p. 80. The 
spelling of the quote has been modernized. 
29
 See Constanze Semmelmann, „General Principles of EU Law: The Ghost in the Platonic Heaven in 
Need of Conceptual Clarification‟, Pittsburgh Papers on the European Union, Volume 2, (August 2013), 
PPEU 2013.7 for how the CJEU has evolved from a natural law to positivist understanding of EU Law. 
30
 For an overview of these theories see Stig Strömholm, „Scandinavian realism‟, European Review, 2.3 
(1994) 193-199. 
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positivistic approach of HLA Hart
31
, the interpretivism of Ronald Dworkin
32
, even legal 
anthropological approaches which view legal principles as ultimately being socially 
constructed.
33
 However the selected and central methodological approach for this thesis 
is that of legal theorist Hans Kelsen. 
Hans Kelsen‟s theory of law is known as „The Pure Theory of Law.‟34  The emphasis of 
his theory lies in the concept of the norm as the a priori element of all law, with all 
other elements, including the posited law itself, being mere appendages.  
A norm is broadly defined as a statement of „ought-ness‟, for example if someone 
commits murder they ought to be punished with life imprisonment, or laws enacted by a 
national parliament ought to be permitted by the national constitution. Thus norms in 
Kelsen‟s system can have either a functional or ethical orientation.35     
Kelsen believed that these underlying can be ranked with differing degrees of primacy, 
thus forming a changeable and expandable hierarchy, called a Stufenbau. At the peak of 
a hierarchy of norms or normative order is the Grundnorm.  
The Grundnorm is the central normative principle of a legal order; the dominant norm 
to which all the other norms in that order are subordinate to and ultimately derive their 
validity from.
36
 Thus the Grundnorm is the very foundation of a posited legal order, the 
ultimate purpose and aim of a system of law. 
A notable example of a Grundnorm is from Kelsen himself; he identified the 
Grundnorm or „fundamental value‟ of the order of international law as „peace‟.37 As we 
                                                 
31
 Scott Shapiro, „The “Hart -Dworkin” debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed‟, Public Law and  Legal 
Theory, (March 2007), Working Paper No.77 
32
 Robert George, „Natural  Law, the Constitution, and the Theory and Practice of  Judicial Review‟, 
Fordham  Law Review, 69.6 (2001), 2269-2283   
33
 Simon Roberts, Order and Dispute: An Introduction to Legal Anthropology, 2
nd
 edn., (London: Quid 
Pro Books, 2013) 
34
 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, trans. by M. Knight (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1967) 
35
 Jörg Kammerhofer, „Kelsen – Which Kelsen? A Reapplication of the Pure Theory to International 
Law’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 22 (2003), 225-249 
36
 Kammerhofer, p. 242 
37
 Noberto Bobbio and Danilo Zolo, „Hans Kelsen, the Theory of Law and the International Legal 
System: A Talk‟, European Journal of International Law, 9 (1998), 355-367, p. 4 
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shall see, this somewhat foreshadows our Kelsenian analysis of the legal order of the 
European Union.
38
  
The concept of the Grundnorm has been criticised for being overly simplistic.
39
 For 
example, a popular contrasting approach to Kelsen in current scholarship, particularly 
with regard to EU law, is the pluralist model.
40
 A pluralist model conceives of the 
European Union legal order as consisting of „multiple, unranked, legal sources‟41. 
Proponents of this theory argue that, for example, the various interrelated claims of 
supremacy made by the CJEU for EU law and the Court of Justice itself within the EU 
legal order are often disputed by national supreme courts; thus there are inconsistent 
rules of recognition within EU law.
42
 The EU legal system must therefore be understood 
as „pluralist‟ rather than monist as it is in Kelsen‟s theory. 
Yet this approach, although useful in many ways, ignores the admittedly highly 
theoretical concept of legal validity. This is best illustrated by example. Judge Smith 
believes that statement x is legally valid. Judge Jones believes that statement x is not 
legally valid. Although such a situation might seemingly reflect „inconsistent rules of 
recognition‟ as supported by the pluralist theory, this implicitly subordinates the validity 
of a legal norm to the opinion of a judge; in other words the concept of legal validity is 
robbed of all pragmatic use. Legal validity becomes “legal validity”; it can only be 
understood subjectively. Rather legal validity, if it is to be a meaningful concept at all, is 
an objective truth that is recognised by a judge. So in this example either Judge Smith or 
Judge Jones must be mistaken, although in practical terms it may be uncertain as to 
which judge is wrong.
 43
 
                                                 
38
 Richard Latta, „Hans Kelsen and the Bindingness of Supra-National Legal Norms‟, Thesis, (Atlanta: 
Georgia State University, 2012), p. 12 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 See for example Nicholas Barber, „Legal Realism, Pluralism and Their Challengers‟, Oxford Legal 
Studies, Research Paper No.76/2012 (2012) and Nicholas Barber, „Pluralism and the European Union‟, 
European Law Journal, 12.3 (2006), 306–32. 
41
 Barber, „Pluralism and the European Union‟,  p. 1 
42
 Ibid., p. 18 
43
 Alexander Somek, „Kelsen Lives‟, The European Journal of International Law, 18.3 (2007), 409-451, 
(pp.424-25) 
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For Kelsen, validity within a legal order is „one and indivisible.‟ As there is only one 
legal validity there can only be one legal system. For Kelsen, the indivisible nature of 
legal validity suggests that a legal order always possesses an underlying normative 
structure, and by extension a dominant norm giving validity to that structure, the 
Grundnorm.
44
 
The rejection of legal validity as an objective concept by pluralists suggests that they are 
not really talking about law per se but rather how legal structures actually work in the 
„real world‟. This is of course an extremely important area of inquiry, but not congenial 
to the purposes of this thesis, which as noted is primarily concerned with answering a 
normative question „in‟ law rather than „about‟ law. Alexander Somek has commented 
with regard to the pluralist theory; 
„…alleged legal structures (in pluralist thought) internally cease to have normative 
force. Instances of pluralism yield evidence that strategies of regime-management 
involve the hybrid mixing of rules of thumb, technical expertise and processes of mutual 
accommodation. Their operation may not be susceptible to construction in legal 
terms.‟45 
If the Kelsenian concept of a single legal validity is accepted over and against the 
pluralist approach, then this suggests the underlying normative basis of a legal system 
can in fact be identified, and is thus not ultimately dependent on the views of a Court or 
similar adjudicating body. Thus if EU law truly has an underlying normative structure, 
then the question as to whether the EU legal order has an ultimate ethical basis can be 
given an answer with at least some degree of objective certainty. 
Yet at the same time it is not claimed that Kelsen‟s theory offers the only, or even 
necessarily the best, explanation of the nature of the EU legal philosophy. The primary 
reason for the selection of Kelsen over and above competing legal theories is that the 
„toolbox‟ that his theory provides is highly congenial for the purposes of this thesis, 
which is to gain insight into the underlying normative framework of the EU legal 
                                                 
44
 Somek, p. 425 
45
 Ibid. 
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system.
46
 Recall that for Kelsen the posited law always has a derivative nature; it is 
always reliant on an underlying norm that can always be ranked. Even if the concept of 
the Kelsenian norm, with the associated Grundnorm, is wholly or partially rejected, 
surely this analytical framework does at least give some insight into the overall 
normative basis of the European Union legal project which, as noted above, continually 
makes claims about its normative basis of „goodness‟. Kelsen gives us a persuasive, 
rather than a definitive, answer as to the core normative basis of EU law; it is 
acknowledged that other theories may „model‟ the legal system of the EU in a more 
„realistic‟ fashion, yet these lack Kelsen‟s primary focus on the norm as the basic unit of 
a posited legal system.  
2.4 Ethical theories 
Once the Grundnorm of EU law is identified, our positivist approach separating law and 
morality allows us to assess it using the two most prominent theories of ethics to answer 
the research questions; they are the categorical imperative and utilitarianism. 
2.4.1 The categorical imperative 
The categorical imperative was originally articulated by eighteenth century philosopher 
Immanuel Kant in his book Critique of Practical Reason.
47
 Kant defined the moral 
worth of an action is in its accordance with the „conception of law in itself.‟ The effect 
expected from an action, even if it is „the promotion of the happiness of others‟ is 
irrelevant to its moral worthiness. Kant states this principle as „I am never to act 
otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.‟ 
Kant argued that the „common reason‟ of men always has in view this universal 
principle. 
Kant discussed the example of whether it is right to make a promise under duress even 
if there is no intention to keep it. Kant distinguishes between the prudence and rightness 
                                                 
46
 See Nik de Boer, „Fundamental Rights and the EU Internal Market: Just how Fundamental are the EU 
Treaty Freedoms? A normative enquiry based on John Rawls political philosophy‟, Utrecht Law Review, 
9.1 (2013), 148-168 for a similar normatively focussed approach using a Rawlsian framework. 
47
 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason (1787). Project Gutenberg ebook. The summary and 
all the quotes from Kant in this section are based on this edition.  
18 
 
of such an action. The action may or may not be prudent – it may extricate a party from 
present difficulty by means of the falsehood or there may be the consequence of later 
injury as a result of the lie. In the latter case the individual may then resolve never to 
make false promises as a result, but such a resolve would only be based on the fear of 
the consequences. By contrast, by applying the „universal maxim‟ question outlined 
above; „Would extricating myself from difficulty via a false promise hold good as a 
universal law, for myself as well as others?‟ the lack of moral rightness in the action is 
instantly identified; the application of this „maxim‟ universally would lead to no 
promises at all.  
According to Kant, the key moral question an individual must ask himself in any 
situation is therefore „Can you also will that your maxim should become a universal 
law?‟ If the answer is negative, then the action cannot be pursued, but not because of 
any disadvantage accruing to the individual or any other party, but because of the duty 
owed to the universal and practical law.  
The categorical imperative is thus defined as:  
„Treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case, as an 
end and never as a means only.‟ 
Kant and his followers thus take a deontological approach to ethics; the moral worth of 
an action is evaluated according to its intrinsic rightness rather than its consequential 
outcomes. A Kantian legal system takes „… a deontological approach to normative 
power (emphasizing) the rationalization of duties and rules … the approach 
emphasizes the means through which actions are motivated and practised. In this 
respect, much weight is placed on the establishment of law, including both rights and 
duties …‟48 
Hence it is suggested that a legal system with a Kantian basis would have the upholding 
and ethical values at its centre; in other words we would expect the Grundnorm of such 
a legal order to have a deontological ethical basis. 
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2.4.2 Utilitarianism 
In his famous essay „Utilitarianism‟49 John Stuart Mill defines the main problem in 
philosophy as the „criterion of right and wrong‟ which he also described as the summum 
bonum (highest good) or the foundation of morals. He highlighted that this controversy, 
which he defines as the struggle between popular morality and utilitarianism, has 
existed since Plato. 
The utilitarian answer to the controversy is the „Greatest Happiness Principle‟, with Mill 
stating this as „actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong 
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.‟ He describes „happiness‟ as pleasure 
and the absence of pain, with „unhappiness‟ being the opposite. Maximisation of 
pleasure and freedom from pain is thus the desired end of Utilitarian morality. 
Thus the Utilitarian definition of what is morally right is not just the happiness of the 
agent, but that of all involved parties. Mill invoked the Golden Rule of Christianity: To 
do unto others as you would be done by
50
, and to love your neighbour as yourself
51
, as 
the „ideal perfection‟ of his system of morality. Application of utility would then entail, 
firstly, that laws and social arrangements would place the „happiness‟ (or „interest‟) of 
every individual in harmony with the whole, and secondly, that education should 
establish in the mind of all individuals an „indissoluble association‟ between his own 
happiness and that of the whole. 
The formal definition of Utilitarianism is thus:  
„That happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things 
being only desirable as means to that end.‟  
Promoters of this ethical theory generally summarize it validity as follows: it is self-
evident that all persons desire happiness; happiness therefore must be a good; and so if 
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the happiness of a person is a good to that person then the general happiness must be a 
good to the aggregate of all persons in society. 
Returning to the assessment of the legal philosophy of the European Union, utilitarian 
ethicists are more focused on the impact and implications of the EU legal order for its 
citizens and other affected parties rather than its origins and underlying principles. The 
Utilitarian approach is thus teleological, focussing on ends or consequences, rather than 
deontological, focussing on means. 
Thus for a utilitarian ethicist, the Grundnorm of a moral legal order must emphasise 
consequentially ethical outcomes. The Grundnorm of such a legal system is thus 
teleological rather than deontological.     
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3. Methodological approach 
3.1 Scope 
In line with the „purist‟ positivist approach of Kelsen, this thesis defines European 
Union law as law that is expressed in its primary, secondary and supplementary sources; 
chiefly the EU Treaties, as well as the closely associated case law of the Court of Justice 
and other courts. The focus will be on the Treaties and case law currently in force 
(essentially the post-Lisbon Treaty EU legal environment) but there will also be some 
consideration of prior iterations of the Treaties, expired legal instruments and over-
turned court rulings where such historical examination gives insight into the current 
situation. The complex interaction of the various organs of the EU polity in the drafting 
and implementation of Community law such as the Commission, the Member State 
governments, the Council and so on are mostly outside the scope of this thesis, which is 
interested in understanding EU law as it is posited in these core documents; EU law „as 
is‟. As previously stated, it is research „in‟ law, rather than research „about‟ law. 52 
3.2 Research questions 
The research questions are formally stated as follows: 
1. What is the Grundnorm of European Union law? 
2. Can the Grundnorm of European Union law be considered ethical in either 
deontological (Kantian) and/or teleological (utilitarian) terms? 
3. What is the ideal future Grundnorm for the legal order of the European Union?    
To answer the first question, we will identify the core normative values as articulated in 
in the primary documents of the European Union in line with Kelsen‟s theory of the 
norm as the a priori element of all law. A detailed analysis of the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice will then reveal which of these values can be labelled as the 
Grundnorm, which will be formally defined and stated. This will then permit us to 
answer the second question; the identified Grundnorm will be evaluated according to 
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the two competing ethical theories – deontological Kantianism and utilitarian 
consequentialism. The answer to the final question is more nuanced and will somewhat 
rely on which of the two ethical theories is preferable for a truly moral legal system, a 
somewhat subjective judgment influenced by the biases of the author. These 
conclusions will also be influenced by the classical natural law concept of intrinsic right 
and wrong being the basis of all true law.    
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4. The Principles of European Union Law 
4.1 Normative statements within the primary documents of the European Union 
The primary documents of the European Union as of 2014 are: 
 The Treaty on European Union („TEU‟ or simply „the Treaty‟). 
 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union („TFEU‟). 
 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union („Charter of 
Fundamental Rights‟ or simply „the Charter‟). 
It should be noted that the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 renamed the Treaty Establishing the 
European Communities
53
 as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), gave legal force to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), and made 
significant changes to the substance of all the Treaties.   
There is no hierarchical relationship between these three primary documents, even 
though the Treaty on European Union (TEU) is almost always listed first. Article 1 of 
the TEU and Article 1(2) of the TFEU provide for the same „legal value‟ for the TEU 
and the TFEU while Article 6(1) of the TEU states that the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights has equal legal value with the Treaties. 
These documents, although they cannot be formally appellated as the „EU 
Constitution‟54, are nonetheless generally considered to have a constitutional nature 
within the EU legal order.
55
 Thus our initial examination for the central normative basis 
of EU law will focus on them. In Kelsenian terms, these „constitutional‟ documents 
exist at the peak of the EU law normative hierarchy, although as we shall see they are 
not the sole sources of the „constitutional‟ or foundational law of the European Union.  
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A cursory overview of the core documents of the European Union suggests a strong 
ethical orientation. The preamble of the TEU makes reference to:  
„… the universal values of inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, 
freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law … CONFIRMING the attachment 
to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law …‟56 
This normative dimension of the Union is reiterated in Article 2 of the Treaty, which 
states: 
„The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights …‟ 
Similar normative statements can be found in Article 3 and Article 10(1) of the Treaty. 
From this basis, Ian Manners has identified nine normative principles via an 
examination and assessment of the EU Treaties and other closely related documents.
57
 
These principles are re-evaluated and occasionally renamed and redefined below, in 
order to adapt them to Kelsenian methodology; additionally Professor Manners 
identifies both Supranationality and the Rule of Law as a single principle
58
, whereas this 
thesis separates them as in spite of their close relationship, as these norms have distinct 
emphases. Thus ten primary normative principles of EU law are identified.  
4.1.1 Promotion of Peace 
Article 3(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states: 
„The Union‟s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.‟59 
The most obvious aspect of the „promotion‟ of peace within the EU legal environment is 
a country‟s membership within the EU itself; Article 49 states: 
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„Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed 
to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union …‟ 
Thus potential membership of the EU is offered to „any European State‟ – closer co-
operation between these „European‟ countries is obviously a driver of peace in Europe. 
To understand the over-riding presence of this value within the Treaties, it may be 
helpful to conduct an examination of the historical foundations of European integration.  
The Schuman Declaration of 1950, which ultimately led to the establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, described the motivation for 
European integration as; 
„…to make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely 
unthinkable, but materially impossible.‟60 
This philosophy is also reflected by another Community „founding father‟, the 
aforementioned Walter Hallstein. He commented: 
„The war experience had been too overwhelming and clear-cut for the idea of a union to 
be opposed any longer – at least in theory.‟61 
Elsewhere Hallstein critiqued the concept of independent national sovereignty in Europe 
stating that this system; 
„… failed. It failed the only test that would have justified its continuance into our 
century: it failed to preserve peace.‟62 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa comments: 
„After experiencing political oppression and war in the first half of the twentieth 
century, Europe undertook to build a new order for peace … Despite its predominantly 
economic content, the European Union is an eminently political construct.‟63 
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Yet while the promotion of peace could have been legitimately identified as absolutely 
central to the European integration project at its commencement, this normative focus 
has shifted substantially in the subsequent development of the EU legal order. The shift 
in focus is perhaps particularly highlighted by the development of Community defence 
and security law. In line with the explicit goal promulgated by the Schuman 
Declaration, there were also plans at about the same time to establish the European 
Defence Community (EDC), which would eventually have led to a European political 
union. Amongst other things, implementation of the EDC would have created a 
common European army. Logically, countries that share a military are highly unlikely to 
go to war, and thus such a policy would arguably be highly supportive of peace within 
Europe. However the 1952 Treaty establishing the EDC failed to be ratified by the 
French parliament. This very early hesitation to a more deeply integrative approach to 
security and defence with the ultimate aim of European federalism would continue to 
influence the development of the basis of Community law.  
The most immediate example of this hesitancy was the Treaty of Rome of 1957 which 
had the stated objective of ensuring; 
„…the economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate 
the barriers which divide Europe … (via) pooling their resources to preserve and 
strengthen peace and liberty.‟64 
„Pooling of resources‟ amongst the signatories was thus now understood primarily in 
economic, rather than military or political, terms, in order to achieve peaceful ends. 
Enrico Spolaore
65
 identifies two major reasons for this historical and on-going 
resistance to a European federalist approach to defence and security. The first reason 
relates to political economy. Europe consists of heterogeneous populations with a 
diversity of languages, culture and identity. From an economic perspective, defence is a 
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public good – federalization of this public good would lead to considerable economies 
of scale. Yet such an arrangement would also lead to a monopolisation of coercive 
power over a territory. Historically, such centralization has only been achieved by 
dictatorial rulers. The European integration project has always been respectful of the 
benefits arising from the heterogeneity of the European continent (i.e. Member State 
sovereignty) as well as the principles of democracy. 
The second reason relates to the role of Germany. At the inception of European 
integration West Germany was militarily weak, having suffered defeat in the Second 
World War as well as still being occupied by the Allied victors. Thus pooling of 
military resources imposed few costs on the FRG. As Germany increasingly 
„normalized‟ as a sovereign state, the heterogeneous costs of joining a military-based 
union increased for this country. The resurgence in the German economy during the 
post-war period increased this country‟s influence within the Community, and thus 
these rising heterogeneous costs of were given greater weight at the Community level.  
It is with this background that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as 
described by the current iteration of the Treaties, best be understood. Article 42(1) of 
the TEU describes the goal of the CSDP as; 
„… providing an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. It shall 
provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. 
The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict 
prevention and strengthening international security …‟ 
This vaguely defined „operational capacity‟ has certain limitations on its ambit. Article 
4(2) TEU states: 
„…national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.‟  
Additionally Article 42(2) states that implementation of the CSDP; 
„… shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence of certain 
Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see 
their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) … 
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(The CSDP will) be compatible with the common security and defence policy 
established within that framework.‟ 
To further underline that the CSDP does not create a military alliance of the flavour of 
NATO, Article 42(7) TEU states: 
„If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member 
States shall have toward it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their 
power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not 
prejudice the specific character of security and defence policy of certain Member 
States …‟ 
Compare this with the uncompromising character of Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty; 
„The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they 
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them … will assist the Party or 
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other 
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force…‟66 
An additional component of the provision of security in the EU is provided by Article 
222 (TFEU), the so-called „Solidarity Clause.‟ Article 222 provides for the Union and 
its Member States to act in „a spirit of solidarity‟ if a Member State is subject to a 
natural disaster or a terrorist attack; the Article permits such activities to include 
mobilisation of „military resources.‟ However Article 222(3) requires that those 
decisions that have „defence implications‟ be made unanimously by the Council. Again 
we see a strongly constrained approach to the potential usage of military instruments in 
the current Treaty framework.  
As previously noted, the absence or subordinate role of military instruments in the 
Community has been occasionally used as an argument for the „peaceful‟ nature of the 
                                                 
66
 Art. 5, North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, 4 April, 1949 
29 
 
undertaking, especially when contrasted with the arguably more militaristic United 
States. Yet as we have seen this policy has been influenced by the concerns of political 
economy and perhaps even Realpolitik, rather than any over-riding ethical commitment 
to „peace‟. Additionally, it could be argued that, in the current international situation, 
with an increasingly aggressive Russian Federation making implicit and explicit threats 
against some EU Member States and EU partner countries, the minimalist military unity 
established by the Treaties actually demotes rather than promotes peace in Europe. 
The CSDP is of course just one aspect of the external policy motivations and 
instruments provided for by the EU Treaties. The Laeken Declaration of 2001 stated 
somewhat ambitiously; 
„Does Europe not, now that it is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new 
world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point 
the way ahead for many countries and peoples? … (Europe has) responsibilities in the 
governance of globalisation … (which it) needs to shoulder.‟67 
In light of this, a primary aim of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty was to establish a better 
organised and more coherent foreign policy for the Union, which again is to a large 
extent another aspect of the promotion of peace norm. As Article 8(1) of the TEU states: 
„The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries … 
characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.‟ 
The TFEU describes some of the specifics of this external action with the aim of 
„peaceful relations‟, which include establishing; 
„… all appropriate forms of cooperation with the organs of the United Nations and its 
specialised agencies, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
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Development … (as well as) relations as are appropriate with other international 
organisations.‟68 
Gosalbo Bono notes; 
„… although not a state, the European Union is a subject of international law and may 
act in international fora, conclude international agreements, is legally responsible 
according to international law, and possess a right of legation (active and passive).‟69 
The Treaties also provide competence to various EU bodies to externally represent the 
Union in particular areas, with the broad aim of the promotion of peace.
70
 The Lisbon 
Treaty has also instituted a new office – with Article 18(1) of the TEU providing for the 
appointment of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy. Article 18(2) TEU states that the High Representative shall „conduct‟ the 
common foreign and security policy of the Union as mandated by the Council while 
Article 27(2) states that the High Representative will conduct political dialogues with 
third parties on behalf of the Union at international conferences and with international 
organizations. Article 27(3) creates the European External Action Service (EEAS) to 
assist the High Representative in fulfilling his or her mandate. Additionally Article 221 
(TFEU) tasks the Union delegations at both third countries and international 
organizations to represent the Union for both CFSP and non-CFSP activities. 
On the surface, it does seem that impressive structure of external relations offices and 
bodies does display strong commitment to the promotion of peace norm, if we recall 
that stated goals of the Laeken Declaration and the Treaties. However, as we shall see, 
the EU has some characteristics of a national federation but is not one; the result of this 
is that while the Member States have sacrificed aspects of their sovereignty to the EU, 
each individual Member State remains an individual actor in and subject of international 
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law. Thus the EU has considerably „fragmentation‟ in the governance and hence the 
conduct of its external relations.
71
  
In conclusion, as European integration has developed, the promotion of peace normative 
value seems to have diminished in importance as the Community legal order has 
developed. Yet at the virtual inconceivability of a war between EU Member States, and 
in particular the cessation of the historic enmity between France and Germany, still 
suggests that this normative value has primary status within the EU legal order. 
4.1.2 Supranationality 
The EU is arguably one of the quintessential examples of supranationality. Article 47 of 
the TEU explicitly attributes legal personality to the supranational institution of the EU. 
Additionally the value is upheld via the acquis communautaire, the governance 
provided by the European Union legal system itself.
72
 The supranational legal regime is 
applied to the Member States via the long established Court of Justice doctrine of 
supremacy.
73
 Yet to fully understand the development and current status of this 
normative value within the EU legal order it may be once again helpful to examine the 
views of „founding father‟ Walter Hallstein. Hallstein was deeply impressed and 
influenced by the United States model of federal liberal democracy, and much of his 
work as both politician and legal scholar was to „import‟ the US federalist model to 
Europe.
74
 Henriette Müller summarises Hallstein‟s conceptualisation of the functions of 
the Community as follows: 
„Firstly, it is a legal system with contracts, treaties and legal institutions; secondly, a 
legal entity composed of states under the rule of law; and thirdly, the balance of power 
within the Community is determined by law and not by power or force – as had mainly 
been the case in international relations prior to 1945; fourthly, it is built on trust and 
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confidence among the countries and its peoples; and finally, it serves as lever for 
integration – integration through law.‟ 
Hallstein conceived of the Commission as the executive body of the Community, with a 
will independent of the Member States governments, in simplified terms the 
Commission would occupy the same place in the Community legal order as the Federal 
government does in the United States of America.
75
 
Yet Hallstein‟s vision for a „United States of Europe‟, aside from meeting strong 
political resistance from various quarters, has also not been reflected in the current 
permutation of the Treaties, which limits the areas where the EU can operate via long-
established principles including conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality
76
. 
Application of these principles, as well as others related to them, have the overall effect 
of a protective approach to the sovereignty of the Member States where they still 
possess „competencies‟ apart from the Union; this in turn leads to a de-emphasis of the 
supranationality norm within the EU legal order, as state sovereignty has a somewhat 
dichotomous relationship with this value. As we shall see, the constrained approach to 
implementation of supranationality has also been reflected numerous times in 
Community law jurisprudence as well as the sui generis nature of the EU itself. 
4.1.3 Rule of Law 
As previously noted, the European Union is pre-eminently a creation of law, and thus 
the normative value of the rule of law is intrinsic to its very nature. This is also formally 
articulated in the Treaties. Both the Preamble and Article 2 of the TEU uphold the „rule 
of law‟ as one of the values upon which the European Union is „founded‟, and this is 
also explicitly stated in the Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
In addition, the Treaties strongly uphold the norms of international law, with Article 
3(5) of the TEU stating that the Union will uphold; 
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„… strict observance (of) and (assistance with the further) development of international 
law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.‟ 
Compliance with the norms of international law is also specifically articulated in Article 
21 (TEU) where the aims of the EU external policy are described; in Article 214 
(TFEU) with regard to humanitarian aid operations conducted by the EU; in Article 49 
of the Charter where criminal offences against international law are recognised 
alongside those of national law; and in Article 53 of the Charter where it is stated that 
the rights protection provided by the Charter will not adversely affect those rights and 
freedoms protected by international law and international agreements. Related to the last 
two Articles, it could indeed be argued that the entire human rights framework 
established by the Lisbon Treaty is itself an explicit recognition of the binding character 
of international law.
77
 
Yet this articulation of the rule of law and the closely associated recognition of 
international law principles within the EU primary documents seems to have an 
interdependent relationship with other Treaty values such as human freedom, dignity, 
democracy and so forth. In other words within the EU legal order this normative value 
of rule of law in not distinct, but must be understood in the light of other values.
78
  
4.1.4 Common Market 
Article 3(3) of the TEU states: 
„The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability …‟ 
Ian Manners
79
 labels this norm as „Social Freedom‟, noting that Article 3(2) of the 
Treaty states: 
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„The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without 
internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured …‟80 
However the „freedom‟ described in Article 3(2) seems to relate primarily to the „free 
movement of persons‟, one of the four market-related freedoms of the EU.81 In other 
words, the „freedom‟ described here primarily has an economic basis. 
Manners also identifies „freedoms‟ such as freedom of thought, freedom of expression 
and freedom of assembly, as expressly articulated in Article 14 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights as well as being implicitly provided for in the accession to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights,
82
 as part of his identified 
„Social Freedom‟ norm. However these values are perhaps best considered distinct from 
the economic „freedom‟ as provided by the internal market. Instead, this thesis considers 
these socially-oriented freedoms as part of the secondary „associative human rights‟ 
norm discussed below. 
As our subsequent discussion of Court of Justice jurisprudence will illustrate, the 
economically-focussed Common Market norm, considered as distinct from norms 
related to „social freedom‟ or other values, ethically-oriented or otherwise, occupies an 
absolutely central position in the EU legal order. 
4.1.5 Democracy 
Article 10(1) of the TEU states: 
„The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy.‟ 
Article 10(2) creates the concept of European citizenship, noting that these citizens are 
represented by both the European Parliament (EP) and their democratically elected 
Member State governments. Article 10(3) enumerates a „right to participate‟ in the 
„democratic life‟ of the Union. Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty83 introduced the 
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mechanism of the European Citizens‟ Initiative (ECI) which permits citizens to directly 
„invite‟ the Commission to initiate legal proposals via referenda.84 
Various other Treaty Articles describe the democratic rights of EU citizens such as the 
right to apply to the European Ombudsman and address EU institutions in any Treaty 
language.
 85
 The Charter of Fundamental Rights also upholds democracy as a principle 
of EU law.
86
  
 
 
Outside of the „four walls‟ of the Treaties, it should also be noted that the European 
Union also has a long tradition of promoting democracy as part of both pre-accession
87
 
and post-accession
88
 strategies. Most prominent among the pre-accession policies is the 
so-called „Copenhagen criteria‟. In 1993 the Copenhagen Economic Council established 
the rules of accession for a candidate country for the Union which include „stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy.‟89 Yet as we shall see, this value occupies a 
somewhat subordinated role in the EU legal order, due to the long-standing „democratic 
deficit‟ of the Community polity. 
4.1.6 Associative Human Rights 
There are a number of aspects to the protection of human rights within the EU Treaty 
framework. Mostly prominent is of course are the rights identified in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which as we have noted is given the „same legal value‟ as the 
Treaties
90
. Closely associated with this is Article 6(2) of the TEU, which provides for 
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the European Union to accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Article 6(3) states these fundamental rights 
are „general principles of the Union‟s law‟, alongside the rights protection provided by 
the „constitutional traditions‟ of Member States. 
However note the following constraint described in Article 6(1) with regard to the 
application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; 
„… The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the 
Union as defined in the Treaties.‟ 
The Union‟s accession to the ECHR has similar restrictions: 
„Such accession (to the ECHR) shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in 
the Treaties.‟91 
The constrained approach is reiterated in Article 51(1) of the Charter: 
„The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law … and respecting the 
limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties.‟ 
Thus the ambit of the Charter is limited according to the distinctive EU legal principle 
of subsidiarity and related limitations on EU competence. This is further underlined by 
Article 51(2): 
„The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers 
of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union …‟ 
Yet at the same time Article 52(3) of the Charter states with reference to those rights 
guaranteed by the European Convention; 
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„… the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the 
said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive 
protection.‟ 
The Charter thus requires that the standard of human rights as articulated by the Charter 
be at least as high as those upheld by the Convention. This aims to prevent the situation 
where a Member State is subjected to two different and possibly conflicting standards of 
human rights law, as well as ensuring any amendments to the Convention will 
„automatically‟ become part of EU law. 
Additional rights protection is provided by Article 151 of the TFEU which provides for 
some recognition for the rights articulated in the European Social Charter and the 1989 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. It could also be said 
that the adherence of the Treaties to the principles of international law also promotes 
fundamental rights protection within the Union. The prioritisation of human rights 
within the EU legal order by the Court of Justice will be discussed extensively below. 
4.1.7 Social Equality 
Article 3(3) of the TEU states: 
„The Union shall establish an internal market. It … shall combat social exclusion 
and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between 
women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the 
child.‟ 
In line with this Article 9 of the Treaty states: 
„In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its 
citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies.‟ 
The EU legal order thus has an underlying norm relating to elimination of 
discrimination on grounds such as sex, race and religion, but it should be noted that this 
normative value ultimately arises from the afore-mentioned Common Market norm. 
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4.1.8 Equitability 
Closely related, but distinct from, the social equality principle is that of economic 
Equitability. Other parts of Article 3(3) of the Treaty articulate this principle: 
„The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for … balanced economic 
growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
employment …‟ 
Supporting this, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) Opinion on 
„The Social Dimension of the Internal Market‟ argues that: 
„The social dimension is a core component of the internal market … The internal 
market is an arena in which both the social dimension and other dimensions find their 
expression. To flourish, sustainable economic growth and jobs must be created which in 
turn generate tax revenues which are the basis for social entitlements.‟92 
Again we see a norm with a derivative relationship with the Common Market norm.  
4.1.9 Sustainable Development 
Article 3(3) of the TEU also states the goal of „sustainable development … a high 
level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment‟. „Sustainable 
development‟ as well as „environmental protection‟ is mentioned in the Preamble of the 
Treaty, but again this is understood in „the context of the internal market.‟93 
Additionally various environmental and sustainability goals are also promulgated in 
Article 21(2), which discusses the international relations aims of the Union.  
4.1.10 Transparent governance 
Article 11 of the TEU states, with regard to the governance of the EU institutions: 
„The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative 
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all 
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areas of Union action. … The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and 
regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society … The European 
Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to 
ensure that the Union‟s actions are coherent and transparent.‟ 
Articles 15 and 16 of the TEU also impose various requirements for consultation and 
open dialogues on EU institutions. Echoing this philosophy of openness through 
consultation, Article 2 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality, which clarifies the implementation of the principle of 
subsidiarity by EU institutions,  requires that the EU Commission „consult widely‟ 
when proposing legislative acts, except in cases of „exceptional urgency.‟  
The Treaties also uphold the goal of promoting good governance in the international 
system with Article 21(2) stating: 
„The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a 
high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to … promote 
an international system based on … good global governance.‟ 
From a conceptual viewpoint the norm of transparent and open governance is of course 
strongly inter-related to the normative value of democracy; this has even been 
empirically tested,
94
 as well as being strongly derivative of the rule of law norm. 
4.2 Where is the Grundnorm? The centrality of jurisprudence in the EU legal order 
It is indeed undeniable that there are strong normative values within the EU Treaties and 
related documents. However to truly identify the Kelsenian Grundnorm we must also 
examine the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which 
as we shall see is also a „primary‟ source of „constitutional‟ law for the European Union, 
in de facto if not strict de jure terms.
 95
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The centrality of the CJEU in the EU legal system began in the 1960s with the 
judgments of the „constitutional‟ doctrines of direct effect96 and supremacy97. 
Furthermore the Court has gone beyond the method of interpretation of most national 
constitutional courts via an emphasis of the effet utile principle. The effet utile principle 
(which can be translated into English as the principle of effectiveness) is a principle of 
judicial interpretation in international and European law, favouring the interpretation 
which best promotes Treaty objectives and in addition obliges Member States and their 
courts not to diminish the effectiveness of supranational law in their national legal 
orders.
98
 Explicit and implicit employment of this principle by the Court has been 
deemed necessary due to the gaps within Community law, as well as its goal of dynamic 
integration. For example in the seminal Van Duyn case, concerned with the direct effect 
of directives, the Court ruled that; 
„…where the Community authorities have, by directive, imposed on Member States the 
obligation to pursue a particular course of conduct, the useful effect of such an act 
would be weakened if individuals were prevented from relying on it before their 
national courts and if the latter were prevented from taking it into consideration as an 
element of Community law.‟99 
Several other key cases directly or indirectly reference this principle including 
Leberpfennig, Simmenthal II , Milchkontor, Foto-Frost, Francovich and more recently 
Viking
100
. 
In line with this, the role of the Court has continued to expand, leading to what has been 
described as a „constitutionalization‟ of the European Union; the Court has increasingly 
influenced the substantive content of the Treaties, Community statutes and other sources 
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of law.
101
 Thus the CJEU via the principle of effectiveness not only interprets but can 
be said to create EU law. The relative impact of the CJEU on Community law rivals 
that of the most powerful national constitutional courts.
102
 
The Member States remain the „Herren der Verträge‟ (Masters of the Treaties) while 
other organs of the EU polity such as the Council, the Commission and the European 
Parliament continue to possess considerable legislative and executive power. Yet to 
understand the „constitution‟ of the European Union we must examine the Treaties plus 
the jurisprudence of the Court, even though this jurisprudence officially has 
„supplementary‟ status. Similar to many national constitutional courts, the Court of 
Justice is not only „bouche de la loi‟ (mouth of the law) but occupies a quasi-legislative 
and extremely critical role. As Kelsen commented; 
 „…the Court is always a legislator … it will always add something new.‟103 
But, as shall see, the Court has had to operate in a deeply uncertain environment. 
4.3 The uncertain condition of the European Union 
The European Union is a truly unique type of politico-legal entity. It is commonly 
described as sui generis (of its own genre). It is „less than a state, but more than an 
international organization,‟104 although it possesses some characteristics of both. The 
institutional structure of the European Union has some resemblance to a modern state 
with, for example, both the Council of the European Union and the Commission having 
some characteristics of an executive branch and the directly elected European 
Parliament resembling a national legislature
105
 while the CJEU acts much like a national 
constitutional court. Yet concluding that therefore the EU is therefore essentially a 
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sovereign country is a somewhat misplaced focus on form over content. Specifically it 
ignores the fact that EU has very limited powers in those areas encompassing activities 
generally considered core to modern nation states such as taxation, fiscal policy, law 
enforcement and perhaps most importantly defence and security. Recall Max Weber‟s 
famous definition of a state as an entity with a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force
106
; as the prior discussion of the CSDP illustrates the EU can in no way be said to 
possess this monopoly.    
This restriction on the powers of the EU derives in legal terms from the Treaties 
themselves, which permits the Union act only in certain areas of competence.
107
 
Concomitant with this is the principle of subsidiarity provided for by TEU
108
 which is 
defined by Mark Pollack as; 
„… the notion that the EU should govern as close as possible to the citizen … (and only 
regulate) where necessary to ensure the completion of the internal market and/or other 
fundamental aims of the Treaties.‟109 
The sui generis nature of the European Union also means it possesses characteristics of 
both a federation and a confederation, existing somewhere between the two.
110
 If it were 
a true federation the European Union could perhaps be considered somewhat analogous 
to a national state, however this is precluded by the „shared sovereignty‟ of the EU 
polity between the institutions of the EU and the Member States, as well as the fact that 
the Member States remain sovereign agents under public international law.
111
 In line 
with this, Article 4(1) of the TEU upholds the principle of conferral; that those 
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competencies not imposed by Treaties remain with the Member States. Article 6(2) 
states with regard to the EU Member States that:  
„(The Union) shall respect their essential State functions …‟ 
EU Member States thus retain much of their sovereignty, although the interaction 
between Community and national law can be complex. Member State constitutional 
courts often adopt a dualist approach to the relationship between national and EU law. 
These courts do recognise the principle of supremacy, but this is due to State obligations 
under the general international law relating to treaties, rather than the „unique nature‟ of 
the EU legal order itself.
112
   
The Solange II case
113
, heard before the German Constitutional Court, illustrates this 
difficulty. The German court recognised the primacy of Community law in the 
protection of fundamental rights, but with the caveat that this primacy exists „so long as‟ 
Community law continues to protect rights adequately in accordance with German 
Basic Law;  this finding potentially contradicts the supremacy doctrine central to 
Community law. Similarly hesitation was displayed in the more recent (2013) 
Melloni
114
 case heard before the Spanish Constitutional Court where the majority 
opinion resisted formally establishing EU fundamental rights law part of the Spanish 
constitutional canon.  
The EU is therefore less than a state; yet long-standing Court of Justice jurisprudence 
gives Community law a unique status in the international legal order, suggesting it is 
more than an international organization. In the crucial case Van Gend en Loos the Court 
of Justice stated;  
 „…the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law.‟115 
 This was further underlined by Costa: 
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„By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own 
legal system.‟116 
According to the Court, the Treaties give the Community institutions power of a 
legislative and governmental nature that is independent of the Member States via the 
Member States ceding a portion of their sovereignty to a supranational Union. 
In terms of public international law this is a remarkable development, as nation states 
have traditionally regarded as the ultimate actors or subjects. Some scholars consider 
the EU to be a „self-contained regime‟, a distinct subsystem of international law, which 
makes rules that are not simply the conventional secondary rules of general public 
international law, but have their own character and effect.
117
 Additionally, the Treaties 
also uphold the principle of loyalty, which imposes on Member States the obligation to 
assist each other, take appropriate measures to fulfil the obligations of the Treaty, and 
refrain from taking measures which could jeopardise Union objectives.
118
 The 
substantial and binding nature of the obligations imposed on the Member States via this 
principle suggests that the EU is much more than an organization regulating an 
agreement between States. The highly innovative nature of the EU project in both legal 
and political terms means that even now, over sixty years after its formation, there is a 
great deal of uncertainty as to what the European Union is for; what values determines 
its governance and development.
119
  
Benedict Anderson‟s seminal work „Imagined Communities‟ conceptualises a national 
community as a social construct; where people „imagine‟ themselves to be part of a 
larger group, regardless of whether or not they have direct contact with the other group 
members.
 120
 The European Union does have the character of an „imagined community‟, 
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although it has been noted that it has „big holes and shaky foundations‟121, with a high 
level of instability as illustrated by the numerous political and economic crises of recent 
years. There is a strong on-going debate within the Union about what it means to be 
„European‟; with a great deal of uncertainty as to what this encompasses. For example, 
could Turkey as an Islamic country truly be part of „Christian‟ Europe? Or is even 
posing this question a racist rejection of the long-standing „European‟ value of 
cosmopolitanism? Do „shared traditions‟ such as democracy, parliamentary institutions, 
Judaeo-Christian ethics and the rule of law constitute an intrinsic part of the European 
identity? Or is the drive for European unity less normative and more pragmatic; based 
on the fear of war and outsiders?
122
 The „imagined community‟ of the EU has failed to 
achieve true clarity on these cultural questions. The decline in prominence of the 
promotion of peace normative value as Community law and European integration itself 
evolved also illustrates the on-going „identity crisis‟ of the Community. 
This „identity crisis‟ extends to other areas. The European Union was founded by the 
„Inner Six‟ – France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 
These founding countries have a clearly defined geographical relationship. As of 
writing, the European Union now encompasses 28 Member States, with, as previously 
noted, Article 49 (TEU) opening the possibility of membership to „any European State.‟ 
However Article 49 does not specify what countries are permitted the appellation 
„European State.‟ Thus the spatial limits of the EU are undefined – it is unclear whether 
„Europe‟ encompasses nations such as Turkey, Georgia, Armenia or even Russia and 
the countries of the south Mediterranean.
123
 
This lack of clarity with regard to the legal, political, cultural and geographic character 
of the European Union ultimately culminates in philosophical uncertainty; exactly what 
fundamental values and beliefs underlie the European Union. Another „founding father‟, 
Jean Monnet, the actual author of the Schuman Declaration, had a vision for a „people‟s 
Europe‟; 
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„…cooperation between the nations, important though it is, does not resolve anything. It 
is necessary to look for a merger of interests of the European peoples, and not simply 
to maintain a balance between their interests.‟124 
This „merger of interests‟ seems concomitant with promulgated shared values existent at 
the heart of the EU legal order. Yet as we shall see this vision has only been partly 
achieved; economic union has achieved peace but not led to a unified, normatively-
based, European identity. 
4.4 Uncertainty leading to paradox 
This uncertainty of identity has created a paradox for the Court. In addition to 
establishing the doctrine of direct effect the Van Gend en Loos
125
 case also held that the 
interpretation of the Treaty must be „uniform‟ so that the „new legal order‟ of the 
European Union could provide legal certainty for all those it affects.
126
 This was not a 
particular innovation of the CJEU; it is generally considered that the principle of legal 
certainty is a key feature of the rule of law under most legal systems.
127
 Legal certainty 
means that the adjudication of law must be predictable; that laws must have clarity, 
stability and intelligibility so that those affected by them can evaluate the approximate 
legal consequences of any actions they take.
128
 
In addition to its commitment to legal certainty, the CJEU has been tasked with 
establishing order between actors with goals that are often in conflict; supranational 
institutions, Member State governments, ordinary citizens and other stakeholders. Legal 
certainty in the EU must be tempered by flexibility; not only must the effect of a law be 
predictable, but it must also be acceptable to the constituency it affects.
129
 This means 
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that the more powerful actors within the EU legal system may have a disproportionate 
influence on the law they choose to apply and enforce; therefore the system of law itself 
is influenced by notions of opportunity cost and even Machiavellian power 
calculations.
130
 Thus here we see the appeal of the pluralist interpretation of EU law to 
many scholars. 
In spite of the necessity of legal certainty, the interplay of power between the actors has 
led to hesitation by the Court in defining „common‟ values. Uniform ethical points of 
reference are difficult to locate with the jurisprudence of the Court, beyond „vague 
allusions to a mythic heritage.‟131 In fact the notion of common European heritage 
strongly promulgated during the formation of the Council of Europe was deliberately 
avoided in the original EEC Treaty, and this reticence remains in the current Treaties.
132
 
4.5 Legal principles not ethical values 
The outcome of this uncertainty and paradox is that the core norm of the legal 
philosophy of the EU as has been interpreted by the CJEU is founded on certain 
functional legal principles, rather than deontological values. By functional legal 
principles, it is meant those propositions from which rules might be derived; by 
deontological values, it is meant aspirational aims that are prudential or moral in 
character.
133
 
Essentially, this means that the jurisprudence of the Court has a predominantly technical 
orientation. This is primarily due to historical reasons; the Court was established by the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957 without any values-based jurisprudential theories; rather it was 
simply required to „… ensure observance of law and justice in the interpretation and 
application of this Treaty.‟134 Thus for much of its existence the Court implemented a 
„new legal order‟ without the guidance of any normative „fundamentals‟. Those key 
cases where the Court seems to be constructing a „constitutional edifice‟ for the EU 
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legal order almost always use constrained, functionally focussed language in their 
rulings, rather than an appeal to normative values. For example, the Van Gend en Loos 
case, which established the principle of direct effect and empowered the Court to 
interpret the Treaties in light of their „spirit‟, had the cautious limitation that such 
interpretation be in line with the;  
„… objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a common market.‟135  
Similarly in Costa v. ENEL, which established the supremacy doctrine, the Court ruled 
that in joining the Community; 
„…the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields 
…‟136  
This approach was maintained in the much later Les Verts case: 
„The European Economic Community is a community based on the rule of law, 
inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review a question 
of whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic 
constitutional charter, the Treaty.‟137  
Thus the appeal to the normative value of the rule of law is entirely understood in terms 
of „protecting‟ the Treaty. A similar attitude is evidenced in the „Chernobyl’ case ruling: 
„By setting up a system for distributing powers among the different Community 
institutions, assigning each institution to its own role in the institutional structure of the 
Community  and the  accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community, the 
Treaties have created an institutional balance.‟138 
„Institutional balance‟ is upheld in the EU legal order not due to any rights-based 
separation of powers doctrine or similar normative goal, but solely because the aims of 
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the Treaty require it. Likewise in Francovich, which established the principle of state 
liability, the wording of the ruling again focuses on the aims of the Treaty; 
„…rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty but also by 
virtue of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined manner …‟139 
Again the rights upheld by the Court in this are entirely dependent on the pre-eminent 
place of the Treaty in the EU legal system, rather than due to any underlying universal 
normative values. 
More recently, the Pringle
140
 case of 2012 dealt directly with the operation of the 
„constitutional‟ Treaty document, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, specifically 
Article 47, which articulates the right to effective judicial protection.
141
 Pringle 
concerned the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism Treaty by the euro-
area countries outside the EU legal order, thus possibly breaching this right. The Court 
found that Member States could in fact conclude and ratify such a Treaty without 
breaching the Charter, reasoning that it can only interpret the Charter „within the limits‟ 
of the powers defined within the Treaties.
142
 This ruling followed similar reasoning in 
the near contemporaneous cases of McB
143
 and Dereci
144
. Thus the innovations of 
Lisbon did not fundamentally change the constrained approach of the Court.     
4.6 But what about Article 6(1) and the other normative values stated in the Treaty? 
As noted, Article 6(1) of the TEU recognises the values of liberty, democracy, respect 
for fundamental rights and the rule of law, and we have identified a number of ethical 
norms derived from these values and other recitations in the Treaties. Yet it is argued 
above that such values occupy a subordinate place in the EU legal system normative 
hierarchy. This argument is confirmed by an examination of Court jurisprudence. 
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Arguably the most prominent normative values in customary international law relate to 
the protection of human rights,
145
 so it is perhaps apt that we examine the historic 
approach of the Court to this important area of law. The Court has been long hesitant to 
rule on human rights issues due to the relative silence of the pre-Lisbon Treaties. In the 
early cases of Stork
146
 and Ruhrkolen
147
 the Court found that the Treaties did not give 
the Court competence to adjudicate human rights issues, nor were these rights expressly 
or implicitly guaranteed in the Treaties. 
As we know, the scope of EU law has expanded considerably, particularly with the 
establishment of the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect. In the 1969 case of 
Stauder human rights were recognised by the Court for the first time, however the basis 
for this recognition was in the; 
„… unwritten Community law, derived from the general principles of law in force in the 
Member States.‟ 148  
The Court was thus both protective of the fairly new doctrine of supremacy, as well as 
being mindful of the potential threat this doctrine faced from the constitutional courts of 
the Member States. The primary focus of the ruling was not the protection of human 
rights per se; rather it was protection of the supremacy doctrine via a minor display of 
deference to the national law of the Member States.
149
 
The Nold case of 1974 finally saw the Court find inspiration in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The fundamental rights regime the Court 
established by Nold and subsequently Internationale Handelsgesellschaft had a 
distinctive character; yet once again the broad theme is the limitation imposed by the 
functional nature of the Community legal system. In both these cases, and many 
subsequent ones, the Court submitted the claimant to analysis comprised of three stages; 
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 Firstly, whether the disputed measure had a legitimate purpose. 
 Secondly, whether the measure was necessary to achieve this legitimate purpose. 
 Thirdly, whether the burden imposed by the measure was „disproportionate‟. 
The Court thus balanced fundamental rights protection with the policy goals of the 
Community; recognition of these rights had a restricted scope due to the established 
Community principle of proportionality.
 150
 The AG Opinion in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft stated: 
„…concerning the internal legality of the disputed measures are linked to one and the 
same problem, namely whether or not these measures comply with a principle of 
„proportionality‟ … obligations which are strictly necessary for those purposes 
attained.‟151 
In these early cases the Court thus had a dualist approach to both human rights and the 
general applicability of international law. One scholar has commented that the 
„proportionality test‟ has „nothing specifically law-like.‟152 Instead such a test evaluates 
whether a particular policy is „good‟ in terms of the achievement of Community goals. 
Needless to say, such an approach could hardly be described as motivated by 
deontological values. Instead proportionality gives lawyers a „framework to engage in 
policy analysis in a way that is neither guided nor restrained by regulatory authority.‟153 
Subsequent cases followed this principle. The Omega case did superficially uphold the 
right to human dignity, but its application beyond the specific circumstances of the 
matter adjudicated was limited, and also rights protection was yet again subordinated to 
the Community law principle of proportionality.
 154
 The Schmidberger case similarly 
seemed to uphold the rights to freedom of expression and association, but also 
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„weighed‟ these fundamental rights against the common market principle of free 
movement of goods. The Court commented that their actions should be: 
„… proportionate in light of the legitimate object pursued, namely, in the present case, 
the protection of fundamental rights.‟155 
This conceptualisation of proportionality by the Court of Justice contrasted strongly 
with the approach of the Strasbourg Court.
156
 In the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg 
Court, the „proportionality test‟ is applied when the Court seeks to determine whether a 
restriction applied on the European Convention in accordance with the „margin of 
appreciation‟ doctrine is reasonable. In Handyside157, the Court applied the following 
four question test when a restriction on a fundamental right is being considered: 
 Is there a pressing social need for some restriction of the Convention? 
 If so, does the particular restriction correspond to this need? 
 If so, is it a proportionate response to that need? 
 In any case, are the reasons presented by the authorities, relevant and sufficient? 
Note any restrictions on rights protection is balanced, not by a concept of limited 
competence of the Court, but by the „reasonableness‟ of the restriction itself, with a 
particular deference to „social need‟. Thus the approach of European Court of Human 
Rights is primarily deontological not functional. 
A similar deontological approach by the Strasbourg Court can be seen in the Matthews 
case of 18 February 1999, which concerned a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of 
the Convention („Right to Free Election‟) by a Community Act. The Strasbourg Court 
held that High Contracting Parties were responsible for infringements even if they 
transfer competencies to an international organization such as the Community.
158
 The 
willingness of the Strasbourg Court to participate in the EU legal order if the upholding 
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of deontological protection required it was further developed by the ECtHR in the 
subsequent Bosphorus case, which also illustrated an interaction between the Strasbourg 
and Luxembourg courts.
 159
  
The Bosphorus case concerned the Turkish airline Bosphorus Have Yollari Turizim 
(„Bosphorus‟). The Bosphorus company leased and registered two aircraft owned by the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY); one of these aircraft, while having maintenance 
performed in Ireland, was impounded by the Irish government on the basis of the 
Council Regulation 990/93/EC
160
 in line with United Nations sanctions against 
Yugoslavia. Bosphorus disputed the action before the Irish High Court, arguing that the 
company‟s fundamental right to property had been infringed. The Irish High Court held 
that the Community Regulation did not even apply in this case as Bosphorus was not 
held or controlled by a Yugoslavian person or undertaking. The Irish government 
appealed, and the Irish Supreme Court requested a preliminary ruling from the Court of 
Justice.
161
 
The Court of Justice preliminary ruling stated the following with regard to the disputed 
EC Regulation: 
„As compared with an objective of general interest so fundamental for the international 
community, which consists in putting an end to the state of war in the region and to the 
massive violations of human rights and humanitarian international law in the Republic 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the … (action if performed) by an undertaking based in or 
operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, cannot be regarded as 
inappropriate or disproportionate.‟162 
According to the Court, the disputed Regulation did not infringe on any right; it passed 
the „proportionality‟ test. 
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The Irish Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the Irish government on the basis of the 
Court opinion. In response, Bosphorus brought the case before the ECtHR, arguing that 
the Irish authorities had infringed Article 1 of Protocol No 1 or the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the right to have property respected.
163
  
This case gave the Strasbourg Court the opportunity to identify and clarity its role with 
regard to how it would review Community actions. The decision of Court
164
 had a 
number of aspects. Firstly, the Strasbourg Court ruled that the nature of the complaint 
fulfilled the ECtHR jurisdiction prerequisites of ratione loci, personae and materiae. 
The Court found that Bosphorus fell within the „jurisdiction‟ of Council of Europe 
member Ireland, and therefore the company was protected by the rights and freedoms 
provided by the Convention.
165
  
The Court then examined the applicant‟s claim that the company‟s right to have 
property respected had been infringed by the Irish authorities. With regard to the EC 
Regulation, the Court noted that no Member State of the European Union could lawfully 
depart from its provisions; the Irish government was correct in considering itself 
obligated to impound the aircraft. The Strasbourg Court concurred with the preliminary 
ruling of the EU Court, as well as ruling that the actions of the Irish government passed 
the „proportionality‟ test.166  
Following this point, the judgement becomes more directly relevant to the interaction 
between two human rights regimes of the EU and the Convention. Having established 
that the action of the Irish authorities were appropriate in terms of their obligations 
arising from their membership in the European Union, the Court examined whether the 
obligation-fulfilling actions themselves could be „presumed‟ to be compliant with the 
ECHR system, rather than exhibiting „manifest deficiency.‟ The Court found that, at the 
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present time, the regime for the protection of fundamental rights provided by the EC 
was „equivalent‟ to that provided by the Convention.167 
Judge Ress issued a separate opinion. He concurred with the majority judgement, but 
noted that the concept of the presumption of ECHR compliance by international 
organizations might be unnecessary and even dangerous when Convention signatory 
States transfer their sovereignty to an international organization such as the EU. In other 
words, the presumption of compliance should not limit the ambit of the Strasbourg 
Court to assess violations of the Convention on a case-by-case basis.
168
  
Thus the ECtHR displays much less caution in limiting its jurisdiction if the protection 
of deontological values requires it. It should also be noted that the accession of the 
European Union to the Convention is likely to further embolden the approach of the 
Strasbourg Court to this values protection when it interacts with the Union legal order, 
and thus we may well see the ECtHR move beyond the Bosphorus principle, perhaps 
even to a position of „supremacy‟ over the EU Court.169 
This new „supremacy‟ seems to be reflected in the explicit recognition of the binding 
character of ECtHR case law in the Charter.
170
 The Preamble of the Charter states: 
„This Charter reaffirms … the rights as they result, in particular, from … the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms … 
and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European 
Court of Human Rights.‟ 
Thus in interpreting the Charter, it seems that the CJEU would now be bound by the 
decisions of the ECtHR, although there is some debate about this, given that there is no 
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explicit articulation of this new „Court hierarchy‟ within the Charter or the EU 
Treaties
171
, although the eventual accession of the EU to the ECHR may resolve this. 
The act of accession would seem to have several important impacts. Firstly and most 
obviously, the human rights protection afforded to EU citizens would be significantly 
improved. Post-accession, it would be possible to complain about alleged rights abuses 
by the EU institutions themselves as well as Member States implementing EU law. 
Secondly, the accession will minimise the risk of divergences for the jurisprudence of 
the EU Court and the Strasbourg Court in relation to human rights law; the 
implementation of the Charter might encourage the CJEU to „go it alone‟ given the 
rights protection provided by the Charter is distinct, albeit closely related.
172
 
There is some debate as to whether the imminent accession will jeopardise the 
autonomy and distinctiveness of the EU legal system.
173
 Post-accession, the Strasbourg 
Court will end the „hermeneutic monopoly‟ the Court of Justice possesses over the 
interpretation of EU law in accordance with Article 19 (TEU). Prior to accession, while 
the CJEU might use Strasbourg jurisprudence or national law to reach a decision, it 
remains the ultimate arbiter of the Treaties
174
. Paul Craig comments; 
„The  ECtHR  will be  sensitive  to  the  imperatives  of  the  EU,  and  will  not  lightly 
conclude  that  the  interpretation  accorded  by  the  EU  courts  to Convention  rights 
was  mistaken.  This  does  not  alter  the  fact that …  the ECtHR  will  exercise  
external  control  over  EU  acts  to  ensure  that they  comply  with  the  Convention,  in  
the  same  way  as  for  any other  contracting  party.‟175 
This is of course a major change to the EU legal system. In a recent hearing with regard 
to the validity of the Draft Agreement on the Accession of the EU to the ECHR
176
 the 
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Commission commented that it perceived no structural issue with this new situation; the 
Strasbourg Court will have primacy, but only in a limited capacity, as a specialized 
court for human rights.
177
 Yet this comment may seem to minimise the staunch attitude 
the Strasbourg Court takes to the protection of rights,
178
 and seems to anticipate a 
continuation of a constrained approach to rights protection within the EU Treaty 
framework. 
Indeed, recent human rights cases heard solely by the Court of Justice continue to locate 
the basis of the protection of human rights in legal doctrines and principles specific to 
Community law, leading to a functional rather than deontological approach. A particular 
apt example is the recent Kadi
179
case, which is worth examining in some depth as the 
Court directly states where it believes „very foundations‟ of the EU legal order currently 
exist.  
4.7 The Kadi case: Functional basis of the EU law Grundnorm confirmed 
Yasin al-Qadi (Kadi) was identified by the UN Security Council as a possible associate 
of the Al-Qaeda terrorist group. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the Security 
Council is permitted to adopt resolutions to „maintain or restore international peace and 
security‟. Article 25 of the UN Charter obligates UN members to „accept and carry out‟ 
these resolutions. With these Articles as its legal basis, the UN Security Council 
therefore „blacklisted‟ al-Qadi, taking various sanctions against him including freezing 
of his financial assets.
180
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The then Second Pillar of the European Union, the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, permitted the Council of the European Union to create a „Common Position‟ on 
foreign affairs binding on Member States (but not individuals). After the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001 this Common Position encompassed agreement to 
implement various anti-terrorism resolutions enacted by the UN Security Council, 
including various sanctions on identified associates of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban or Osama 
bin Laden. In addition to the Common Position, in 2002 the Council of the European 
Union adopted Regulation (EC) 467/2001 (which was subsequently replaced by 
Community Regulation (EC) 881/2002) transposing the „accept and carry out‟ 
requirement of Article 25 of the UN Charter in EU law. In line with the UN measure, al-
Qadi was one of the sanctioned individuals listed in the EC Regulation.
181
 
Mr al-Qadi disputed the Regulation before the General Court (GC). The GC initially 
refused to review the transposed Regulation as this would essentially entail reviewing 
the UN Security Council measure. On appeal, the Court of Justice instead evaluated the 
lawfulness of the Community regulation itself in light of the protection of fundamental 
rights, with the Court stating:  
„Fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law whose 
observance the Court ensures … Respect for human rights is therefore a condition of the 
lawfulness of Community acts, and measures incompatible with respect for human 
rights are not acceptable in the Community.‟182 
Yet in spite of noting that the protection of fundamental rights is an „integral part‟ of the 
EU legal order, the Court made the following constraining comments:  
„The Community is based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor 
its institutions can avoid review of the conformity of their acts with the basic 
constitutional charter, the Treaty, … An international agreement cannot affect the 
allocation of powers fixed by the Treaties or, consequently, the autonomy of the 
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Community legal system, observance of which is ensured by the Court by virtue of the 
exclusive jurisdiction conferred on it … jurisdiction that forms part of the very 
foundations of the Community.‟183 
The „very foundation‟ of the EU legal order is thus located in the „constitution‟ provided 
by the Treaty itself. This was further reiterated by the ruling of the Court in relation to 
the validity of Community Regulation (EC) 881/2002:   
„Implementing such measures through the use of a Community instrument does not go 
beyond the general framework created by the provisions of the EC Treaty as a 
whole, because by their very nature they offer a link to the operation of the common 
market …‟184 
This approach of the CJEU was noted by the French government in its submission as a 
third party intervener in Nada v Switzerland
185
, a case heard before the ECtHR which 
shared many similarities with Kadi. The French government commented that in Kadi 
the Court of Justice „had relied on the constitutional nature of the EC Treaty for its 
review‟186 of the Regulation i.e. not an appeal to universal deontological values.  
Thus the Kadi case echoed the earlier cases in confirming the functional nature of the 
Grundnorm of the EU legal order, with the over-riding „normative‟ principle being the 
upholding of the operation of the single market via the constitutional framework 
provided by the Treaties. 
4.8 Other normative values – present but not central 
The Court has taken a similar approach to the other normative values present in the 
Treaties. For example, the „right to liberty‟ is generally related to the „four freedoms‟ of 
the single market in the jurisprudence of the Court;
 187
 once again the norm is concerned 
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with economic aims rather than deontological values. With regard to the closely related 
value of democracy, the Court‟s approach has been described as „vaguely desperate‟188.  
It might be expected that the rule of law would have a more central basis in CJEU 
jurisprudence, given the Court‟s often bold and arguably „activist‟ reading of its 
mandate to safeguard the Treaties.
189
 But again this recognition of this right by the 
Court has only been in areas of uncontested exclusive competence, with the Court 
perhaps sensitive to accusations of surreptitious federalism.
190
 For example, in Van 
Schijndel the Court commented that Community law does not require national courts to; 
 „…abandon the passive role assigned to them in civil proceedings by going beyond the 
ambit of the dispute defined by the parties themselves and relying on facts and 
circumstances other than those on which the party with an interest in application of 
[Community law] bases his claim.‟191 
Again we see the Court take a constrained, rather than values-based, approach, this time 
influenced by wariness in overstepping its competence in interacting with the legal 
order of a Member State. 
Similarly in cases including Kapferer
192
, Kühne
193
 and Köbler
 194
 the Court ruled that 
res judicata („a matter already judged‟) applied not only to the judicial review, but also 
to the rulings of national courts.
195
 This is in spite of rulings on both national
196
 and 
supranational
197
 level which held that this doctrine is not inviolable, as well as the views 
of some legal scholars that the doctrine itself is highly problematic, and often at odds 
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with legality.
198
 The Court once again held a position that was arguably overly 
protective of the competences of the national courts at the expense of the upholding of 
the rule of law.
199
 
A similar approach can be seen in subsequent cases heard by the Court. For example, in 
Eldafaji case of 2009 the Court was extremely careful to identify a distinction between 
the „protection from harm‟ right provided for by an Article of a Council Directive and 
that of Article 3 of the ECHR. Thus the Court was able to primarily analyse the ambit of 
the right in terms of Treaty competence.
200
  
Likewise in the Bressol
201
 case of 2010, although the Court upheld the right to 
education expressed in Article 13 of the UN International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Andrew Williams comments with regard to the ruling;  
„… the right only gains form through its relationship with EU Treaty concerns 
(fundamentally market freedoms) … (it) seems to enhance the conditionality of the 
Court‟s approach to human rights in general.‟202 
Similarly in the 2011 case Brustle v. Greenpeace
203
, concerned with the CJEU 
definition of an „embryo‟, the Court intrinsically favoured the „fundamental freedoms‟ 
of the Single Market over fundamental rights.
204
 Another 2011 case, Zambrano
205
, 
concerned with EU citizenship, saw the Court „vacillate‟ between the upholding of the 
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fundamental right to family life and the „freedom‟ associated with the common market, 
with the protection of the latter seeming to dominate the Court‟s reasoning.206 
4.9 The Grundnorm of the European Union legal order 
Our analysis leads us to a reasonably decisive identification of the Grundnorm or 
central underlying norm of the EU legal order. The prior discussion illustrates that the 
jurisprudence of the Court has consistently subordinated any recognition of ethical 
values to a functional interpretation of the scope of the Treaties. This seems to be 
primarily due to the often contentious environment created by the various national and 
institutional actors in the EU framework. Andrew Williams somewhat provocatively 
comments that the Court has established the concept of „indeterminacy‟ as a core 
principle of the EU legal framework.
207
 
This thesis therefore answers the first research question as follows: 
“The Kelsenian Grundnorm of the European Union law is the establishment and 
maintenance of the European Common Market, the scope of which is defined and 
governed by the Treaties.”  
Any ethical values existing within the EU legal system are essentially peripheral to this 
central norm. Thus the legal order of the European Union thus has a functional or 
technical basis rather than basis of deontological values. 
The functional nature of the Grundnorm as it exists in the current legal order may be 
something of a disappointment to the founders of the project; recall, for example, 
Walter Hallstein who saw the primary goal of European integration as the promotion of 
peace via gradualist federalism rather than economic expansion. The original European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had the specific aim of making another Franco-
German war impossible; it is reasonable to say this goal has been achieved and perhaps 
even forgotten by the current EU polity. As the integration project has developed, the 
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central normative focus of Community law has shifted from the promotion of peace, to 
the economic advantages associated with the on-going implementation of the Common 
Market. In other words, in the current EU legal order the Common Market has become 
an end in itself, rather than a means to an end.  
Implementation of deontological values within the jurisprudence of the Court has been 
strictly constrained, with a continual reference to the highly restricted competence of 
Community law in the rulings of the Court, an attitude that has continued in the post-
Lisbon environment. As a result, the upholding of values with a predominantly ethical 
basis such as human rights and democracy has been limited in scope, or only permitted 
in so far as they do not threaten the underlying Grundnorm.  
64 
 
5. Ethical assessment of European Union law 
5.1 Can functional law still be ethical? 
We have established that the legal philosophy of the European Union has a 
predominantly functional basis, with the Kelsenian Grundnorm relating primarily to the 
establishment and maintenance of a common European market. Yet this should not in of 
itself be considered as an argument that the European Union legal order is totally 
indifferent to ethical norms. The World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, is 
generally considered a primarily functional legal system
208
 but still has normative aims 
within its areas of competence such as assistance to developing countries, even though 
these norms are subordinate to the central norm.
209
 So it should be noted that a 
predominantly functional Grundnorm is not necessarily an unethical Grundnorm.  
5.2 Application of ethical theories to the Grundnorm of European Union law 
So finally we can answer the second and perhaps most important research question 
posed by this thesis – can the Grundnorm of European Union law be considered ethical 
and thus by extension is the European Union truly a normative institution? Ultimately a 
somewhat nuanced answer must be given – it is, as might be expected, dependent upon 
the selection of the theory of ethics with which the Grundnorm of European Union law 
is evaluated. 
Under the ethical framework provided by Kantians, the Grundnorm of the legal system 
of the European Union cannot be considered a primarily ethical. Recall that Kantian 
ethics take a deontological approach; the standards for the rightness or wrongness of an 
action are independent of the outcome, whether good or bad. The Grundnorm of the EU 
legal order is functional – the primary aim of EU law is to uphold the European 
Common Market. The EU legal system is thus intrinsically teleological – it is focused 
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on economically-oriented ends rather than being foundationally constructed with 
reference to universal underlying deontological values. 
The teleological nature of the EU legal order might however be more congenial to a 
utilitarian ethicist. The utilitarian might admit that the Grundnorm of European Union 
law is indeed the maintenance of a capitalistic market in Europe, with more normatively 
based goals such as the promotion of democracy and human rights subsidiary to this 
central principle. However a utilitarian might note that the European common market 
has had the consequences of achieving goals in line with the „Greatest Happiness‟ of the 
greatest number of people. Achievements such as peace in Europe for over sixty years, 
promotion of democratic ideals in former Communist bloc countries, increasing 
prevalence of the rule of law and human rights in the EU Member States and so on 
would be indicative of the consequentialist normative orientation of the European 
Union. In line with this, Mark Dawson and Elise Muir argue that fundamental rights 
protection can „thrive‟ on the back of the economic drives of the Common Market.210 
The Millian ethicist might also note that the economic benefits of the internal market 
itself leads to more „happiness‟ for both citizens of the European Union and associated 
countries through the greater prosperity delivered via free trade. The utilitarian might 
also be impressed by the fact that the „internal market‟, as envisioned by the Treaties, 
also encompasses a „social market economy‟. The „social market economy‟ 
encompasses the goals of full employment, social progress, environmental protection, 
advances in science and technology,  the prevention of social exclusion and 
discrimination, social protection and justice, gender equality, improving generational 
relations and protecting the rights of children.
211
 Also noteworthy is that the norms of 
social equality, equitability and sustainable development have a close relationship with 
the Common Market norm within the Treaties as discussed above. 
In conclusion, to describe the European Union as „Kantian‟, contrasting it with the 
„Hobbesian‟ United States and other powers cannot be justified if the Grundnorm 
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theory of Kelsen is given any credence. The consequentialist nature of the Grundnorm 
of EU law suggests that the ethical core of the European Union may have more in 
common with the USA than has been traditionally perceived. Both powers do seem to 
operate under the principle of the „end justifying the means‟, albeit that they often 
achieve their goals via different policies.  
The answer to the second research question is summarised as follows: 
“The Kelsenian Grundnorm of the European Union legal system is consequentially 
ethical but is not primarily governed by deontological values.” 
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6. Suggestions for a new legal philosophy for the European Union 
6.1 The consequentialist problem 
The „Millian‟ nature of the Grundnorm of the legal philosophy of the EU immediately 
raises a larger question about the value of consequentialist ethics. Elizabeth Anscombe, 
although a leading developer and proponent of the consequential ethical theories, noted 
that: 
„It is a necessary feature of consequentialism that it is a shallow philosophy. For there 
are always borderline cases in ethics … (Other ethical theories) will deal with a 
borderline case by considering whether doing such-and-such in such-and-such 
circumstances is, say, murder, or an act of injustice; and accordingly you decide it is or 
it isn‟t, you judge it to be a thing to do or not … The consequentialist has no footing on 
which to say “this would be permissible, this not”; because by [their] own hypothesis, it 
is the consequences that are to decide.‟212 
It is the opinion of this thesis that a legal system without deontological values at its very 
core cannot in the longer term achieve truly ethical outcomes. Although we have used 
the positivist toolbox, including Kelsenianism, to analyse the EU legal order, the natural 
law concept that law, for it to be valid, must provide a set of standards in accordance 
with universal ethical norms, must be still highly persuasive to anyone interested in 
ethics. As theologian, philosopher and proto-natural law theorist Augustine of Hippo is 
said to have opined: 
„In the absence of justice, what is sovereignty but organised robbery?‟  
The upholding of „indivisible, universal values‟ in the Preamble of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights seems to recognise this intrinsic maxim. 
In line with this, Katrin Nyman-Metcalf has commented with regard to the articulation 
of normative values in the EU Treaties: 
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„By underlining principles like liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law and 
furthermore spelling out that these principles are shared among Member States, it is 
apparent that there is to be a community of values (in the European Union). This, more 
than the geographical limitation to European States, sets out who can aspire to become 
an EU Member.‟213 
It is suggested that the redefining the EU legal system Grundnorm to a more 
deontological basis may be the best way to achieve this „community of values‟. But 
which of these values should be emphasised above all? 
6.2 How to create a community of values  
Much of the discussion in prior sections could be viewed as an implicit criticism of the 
historically constrained approach of the CJEU jurisprudence to the protection of ethical 
values, leading ultimately to a functionally-based Grundnorm of the EU legal order. 
However we must recall that the Court has had to contend with the uncertain goals and 
nature of the Community polity itself as it has evolved. These goals seem closely related 
to the issue of what the European Union actually is – is it primarily an economic 
vehicle, a prospective Federal State or something else entirely? Recall that founders of 
project such as Hallstein envisioned the ultimate goal of European integration as the 
complete prevention of another Franco-German war, with the creation of a European 
common market merely a means to that end. Now that this end has been largely 
achieved what is next for the European Union? The lack of deontological basis for the 
Grundnorm of the EU legal philosophy ultimately arises from this identity crisis. 
The obvious „Kantian‟ / values-based solution to this identity crisis is to enable the 
citizenry of the European Union to democratically decide what the goals of the 
Community ultimately are – revisiting Monnet‟s concept of the „merger of interests‟ 
created by a „people‟s Europe‟. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that democracy has 
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an „interdependent‟ relationship with human rights,214 and as discussed extensively 
above the constrained approach of the Court of Justice to this area of law is a major 
contributor to the subordinate role of deontological values within the EU legal order.  
Julia Laffranque has commented: 
„Human rights cannot be defended and promoted only by legal instruments and their 
enforcement mechanisms … it is essential that the basic rights are understood and 
upheld by everyone … If we are afraid to speak openly of the concerns weighing on 
Europe, we will create a psychological barrier between the decision makers and 
everyone else that will be difficult to overcome. The people, who should be the 
bearers of supreme power, will no longer understand what role they have to play in 
this entire process. Professor Andreas Vosskuhle, President of the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany, has rightly begun to speak about a crisis of trust in 
Europe.‟ 215 
Thus it seems that democratic values, with the closely aligned norms of human rights 
and the rule of law, should be articulated above all within a future Grundnorm of the 
EU legal order, in order to address this „crisis of trust‟. Yet there are major issues with 
the eminence of the value of democracy in the current iteration of the Treaties. 
6.3 The Democratic Deficit of the European Union 
In spite of the various recitations upholding democratic values in the Treaties previously 
discussed, there is much evidence to support the view that the Union lacks democratic 
legitimacy, a „democratic deficit‟. Firstly there is the argument that that European 
integration has led to an increase in executive power with corresponding decrease in 
national parliamentary power via the supremacy of EU law. Secondly the European 
Commission, essentially the executive power of the Union, is not directly elected, nor 
does it conduct its activities with a high level of transparency. Thirdly, it could be said 
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that the powers of the directly elected European Parliament do not sufficiently balance 
those of the other institutions, especially the Commission. Fourthly, European 
Parliament elections, as they are currently conducted, are not truly „European‟ as they 
are treated by the parliamentary parties and the media essentially as mid-term national 
elections, meaning that the general public are not really voting on Union issues, but 
rather on national issues.
216
  
Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix comment with regard to the structure of the EU 
polity: 
„… there is no electoral contest about the political leadership at the European level or 
the basic direction of the EU policy agenda.‟217   
Additionally it has been noted that the sui generis nature of the European Union does 
not lend itself well to the separation of powers doctrine
218
 – which is generally 
considered a key feature of a parliamentary democracy.
219
 Until the Single European 
Act (SEA)
220
 of 1986, the role of the European Parliament was at most consultative. The 
adoption of the co-decision procedure, now called the ordinary legislative procedure,
221
 
did grant the European Parliament equal footing with the Council; the Lisbon Treaty 
also increased the legislative areas where the ordinary legislative procedure can be 
employed. However the current Treaty framework still retains the special legislative 
procedure for some areas. Under the special legislative procedure the European 
Parliament continues to only have a consultative role, with the Council of the European 
Union acting as the sole legislator.
222
 The Treaties give no „ranking‟ to law created 
under either the ordinary legislative procedure or the special legislative procedure – in 
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other words law originating via the (arguably) „less democratic‟ special legislative 
procedure has the same value as law originating from the ordinary legislative 
procedure.
223
 
The Lisbon Treaty innovation of the European Citizens‟ Initiative (ECI)224, although it 
could be said to encourage a civil society within the Union, does little to correct the 
democratic deficit either. An ECI referendum is non-binding and additionally: 
„The problem with referendums … is that they only allow voters to express their views 
about isolated fundamental constitutional issues and not on the specific policy content 
within a particular constitutional status quo. Referendums are hence ineffective 
mechanisms for promoting day-to-day competition, contestation among policy 
platforms, articulation and opposition in the EU policy process.‟225 
Even the Copenhagen criteria imposed on potential future members of the EU has been 
criticised as „ineffective‟ and „vague‟. Non-compliant candidate countries that do not 
fully comply with criteria do not generally suffer meaningful sanctions.
226
 Furthermore, 
the lack of democratic legitimacy possessed by the Union institutions ironically 
suggests that the EU itself would not meet the criteria it imposes on Member State 
candidates.
227
 As Julia Laffranque comments: 
„If the European Union places great demands on the Member States, it is in no position 
to neglect examining whether and how the EU institutions themselves adhere to the 
European fundamental values.‟228 
Ultimately the source of the identity crisis of the European Union must be located in 
this „democratic deficit‟. Recall the frequent hesitation of the Court of Justice whenever 
there is a potential conflict between Community law and Member State sovereignty; 
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thus leading to a restrained approach to rights protection by the Court as well as a level 
of indeterminacy in many other areas. Implementation of fuller democracy within the 
EU polity via a refocusing of the EU law Grundnorm would surely help to resolve this 
uncertainty, and thus give the Court a clearer guidance as to what the EU is truly for, 
and hence what type of legal order it should construct. Such a view would seem to be 
supported by none other than Pope Francis, who in a recent speech to the Council of 
Europe noted: 
„Today Europe is multipolar in its relationships and its intentions; it is impossible to 
imagine or to build Europe without fully taking into account this multipolar reality … In 
Europe‟s present political situation, merely internal dialogue between the organizations 
(whether political, religious or cultural) to which one belongs, ends up being 
unproductive. Our times demand the ability to break out of the structures which 
“contain” our identity and to encounter others, for the sake of making that identity more 
solid and fruitful in the fraternal exchange of transversality.‟229 
Implementation of democracy and its closely associated norms at the heart of the EU 
legal system would contribute to the creation of a more clarified yet „transversal‟ 
European identity, and thus in turn lead to a truly deontological „community of values‟ 
within the Union. 
6.4 The ideal Grundnorm of the European Union 
Flowing from the above discussion, the answer to the third research question, with 
regard to the ideal future Grundnorm of European Union law, is as follows: 
“The ideal Grundnorm of a future European Union legal order should be 
deontologically-based, with a primary emphasis on democracy and the closely 
associated values of human rights and the rule of law, with the goal of creating a 
community of values in Europe.” 
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Again, to quote a recent speech of influential ethicist Pope Francis, this time to the 
European Parliament: 
„The true strength of our democracies – understood as expressions of the political will 
of the people – must not be allowed to collapse under the pressure of multinational 
interests which are not universal … Awareness of one‟s own identity is also necessary 
for entering into a positive dialogue with the States which have asked to become part of 
the Union in the future … the time has come to work together in building a Europe 
which revolves not around the economy, but … around inalienable values.‟230  
In practical terms achieving the ambitious goal of this new Grundnorm will be 
extremely difficult, and will require as a minimum extensive revision of the Treaties, 
with a particular focus on making the EU institutions more accountable and democratic. 
However, resolution of the identity crisis of the European Union could be expected to 
lead not only to stronger protection and promotion of intrinsic rights within the EU legal 
order itself, but also a greater engagement in the European integration project with the 
approximately 500 million citizens of the Union – perhaps even justifying the claim that 
the European Union is truly a normative power.  
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7. Conclusion 
In summation, this thesis has attempted to identify the underlying normative structure of 
European Union law using the theories of Hans Kelsen. While the Treaties do contain 
many normative statements, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice supports 
the view that the central norm or Grundnorm of European Union law is the 
establishment and maintenance of the European Common Market. This centrality of this 
norm does permit many consequentially ethical benefits, although it cannot be said to 
have a primarily deontological emphasis, rather it has a functional or technical basis. 
The Court constructed this functional Grundnorm due to the challenge posed by the 
indeterminacy of the goals of the Community polity which primarily arise from the 
long-standing democratic deficit, which remains in spite of the reforms of the Lisbon 
Treaty. Thus it is suggested that a future Grundnorm for European Union law emphasise 
democracy with concomitant values of human rights and the rule of law, in order to 
achieve a true community of values in Europe. 
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Appendix 
General notes on the nature of legal research 
The various approaches to legal research can be organised into the following matrix:
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The thesis, with its focus on legal philosophy, will definitely sit within the bottom right 
quadrant; doctrinal methodology with an academic constituency. Legal doctrinal 
research usually takes the form of asking the question „what is the law?‟ in particular 
contexts, in order to discover and develop legal doctrines. This type of research 
contrasts with research in the natural sciences, which attempts to identify the causal 
relationship between variables in order to explain natural phenomena. Thus doctrinal 
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research almost always has a qualitative rather than quantitative epistemological 
emphasis.
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